Monday morning polls

Two new polls continue to show that support for the Maduro government has never been softer.

The first one is from Datanálisis. Obviously, one of the slides that jumps out is the one showing that support for Maduro has never been this low.

Maduro gestion Datanalisis

Nevertheless, we should be careful. While the opposition is currently more popular than chavismo, it’s not like this is the worst chavismo has been, as this graph shows.


As the economic crisis continues, we should expect support for the government to continue going down.

The second one is from Consultores 21. While in general the poll shows similar things to Datanálisis, this is the slide that caught my eye:

Militares culpables

A full 46.9% of the population blames “mafias” and “corrupt military personnel” as being responsible for scarcity. If you add those that say “both,” including “economic war” and “smugglers,” you get 63.8% of the population.

It’s amazing that the military has somewhat not received the brunt of the blame for Venezuela’s problems given how both the previous government and this one are composed of military people through and through. I guess this points to a cultural feature of Venezuela, whereby the military is held aloft as a worthy institution no matter what.

Could that be changing? We’ll see…

(HT: La Patilla)

22 thoughts on “Monday morning polls

  1. Heh.

    It’s somewhat galling that the unambiguously correct answer to the question of “why are there shortages?” (exchange rate misalignment) doesn’t even get a mention in the C21 poll.

    Bien jodidos estamos…


    • The rational assesment looks at policies (FT) , the vernacular (Pollsters) at blaming people whose actions are assummed to control decisions and influence consequences . Policies are abstract and must be analyzed to be understood, people are concrete and we can enjoy hating or liking them depending on our own conceits and judgments .

      The military are not a cohesive solid block , they are divided and fragmented and often at each others throats , their number has been culled to leave only corrupt and careeist cliques , those in govt do not represent the average , they are just the representative sample of different overlaping groups .


    • Actually, it’s a bit more than galling. This should either be an open question or C21 should have provided additional choices. This is just….weird.


    • Quico, read it as follows: scarcity is to blame on mafias and corrupt military personnel who imposed, and enjoy the distortions of, exchange controls.


    • Oppo still believes in blaming the government “pa que suelte los dolares, asi el pueblo puede producir”. Even pollsters hold such views as valid. The “problem” resides in those who live and thrive by arbitrage and not in Cadivi and the distortions created by the “cheapest ten dolar bill ever”.

      Hell, i would pay for a poll asking people why is cadivi evil, answers? Pick one from:

      1- It doesn´t let me trip overseas as i wish.
      2- 300 $ is not enough to buy most phones on Amazon
      3- Filling forms me ladilla
      4- “Deberían poner mas cupos al año” (They should increase $$$ allowance per year)
      5- It creates price imbalances and create an arbitrage driven economy
      6- Cadivi is necessary to avoid capital flight by burgueses apatridas parasitarios / economic war / el imperio.

      Results, in the best “Tibisay” style, as follows:

      52% –> 6 : (32% hardcore chavista base + 20% Gauche Oppo)
      20% –> 1 : Oppo Upper poor class (formerly known as El Cafetal middle class)
      13% –> 2 : Oppo Middle Poor Class, they cannot trip overseas but can afford a phone
      5% –> 5 : Endangered species of critical thinking people.
      6% –> 4: Non enchufado upper class. They swim in BsDebiles
      4% —> 3: Too lazy to do shit


  2. You’re right, Juan. There’s a cultural perception of a good military, the beatification made easier by the military’s soft tread, perhaps designed so by the crafty islanders.

    Just last night I came across 3 tweets in succession by Naples (FL)-based Dr. Marquina that lays the blame on the military for the mess the country is in:

    Jose Rafael Marquina ‏@marquina04:
    La razón por la q se mantiene Maduro en el poder es por la cantidad de dinero q ha gastado comprando militares
    Si existieran militares q les doliera lo q sufren los venezolanos, ya Maduro se hubiera caído
    El día q a los militares venezolanos les duela lo q sufren los venezolanos diariamente, se cae la dictadura

    The third was retweeted by Fernando Del Rincon, formerly or reinstated at CNNE.

    More attention has to be placed on this pervasive feature of Venezuela’s political and cultural fabric.


  3. “Nevertheless, we should be careful. While the opposition is currently more popular than chavismo, it’s not like this is the worst chavismo has been, as this graph shows.”

    Seems to me the really important question is whether the *opposition* numbers have ever been this high, that is, how many have shifted from being nini’s to authentic opposition.


  4. Off topic, but possibly bye, bye Citgo (I do not know if I ever heard about this debt before).

    So began a decade-long legal battle that is headed to trial in an Ohio federal court on April 20. Skye’s bonds have since accrued enough interest to be worth $1.5 billion. That, in turn, puts the cost of redeeming the whole debt issue at $15 billion.
    “If we prevail at trial, other owners of the bonds can take notice of our judicial ruling and pile on,” said Cooper. “But if Venezuela settles before going to trial, the settlement will likely be kept confidential and there will be no finding by a US court that the bonds are legitimate.”
    Reason would seem to favor a settlement, especially in light of indications the court plans to be guided by the original AG’s decree. But Venezuela could decided to go for broke — literally


    • These were no coupon bonds that had an original maturity date of 1991, but which was extended out to 1999. Based on their numbers, Skye seems to think that they should accrue a 12.36% yield off of par, to arrive at that $1.5 billion number, but I think that once they edge past the 1999 maturity date, paid or not, they are in tepid waters in continuing to accrue at that rate. They’d likely be faced with a much lower rate of 3-4% post-maturity date accruals. All told, that would result in a roughly $800 million on yield, and another $200 million or so in interest.

      Note, these bonds were originally owned by a Panamanian investment group that was stiffed when they presented them for payment in 1999. I’m betting that Skye picked them up for much, much less than the face value in 2003.


  5. The one from Consultores 21 should be taken with a grain of salt. It was taken on only 8 metropolitan areas, and, unless we’re talking about places like Táchira, rural areas represent the strength of the chavista vote; as cities tend to vote for the Opposition by larger margins. The areas they polled, ALL of them voted for Capriles on April 2013; in fact, Capriles carried 5 of those cities with margins that exceeded 10 points. So it should come as no surprise that those oppo numbers seem a bit too high (44% sides with the oppo, only 34% for PSUV).


    • Such is the distortion in Venezuela that democratic elections with victorious results for the opposition are considered a coup and not transitions of power.


    • What’s so funny about this? It’s a power strategy to stir up fear and hate. You think the Rwanda blood bath cannot happen in Venezuela? This is very dangerous stuff. This regime doesn’t care about people’s lives.


  6. These people will not recognise any election win by the opposistion.
    If the oppos win a majority they will make the AN mute.

    They will not be moved democratically.

    We have to reach this assumption to move forward.


    • Precisely. The Zimbabwe experience is all too relevant: when it is obvious to almost everybody in a country that the group in power has demolished the economy, that group realizes it must continue in power, by any means, to avoid the inevitable backlash against their own misdeeds. Zimbabwe’s ZANU got help from North Korea; Chavismo has been learning from Castro’s political police, themselves the eager pupils of East Germany’s Stasi, who made the Nazi Gestapo appear easy-going.


  7. OT: The UN rights chief, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, calls for immediate release of opposition leader, politicians.

    In the article, he says “My office is extremely concerned about the current situation, and we will continue to monitor it very closely,”

    I have to wonder about his choice of adjectives, “extremely concerned”. Exactly what would it take to get him “disturbed”, “distressed”, “worried”, “upset”, or some other word expressing a stronger emotion? To me, “concerned” is appropriate for a rash that won’t heal, not 67 blatant political prisoners and reports of systematic torture of detainees.


  8. There will always be blind followers of the Revolution , but they will be a small minority. The economy will continue to decline. Any hope of this regime turning things around will fade away. Thugs and bullets can hold power for a while, but rhetoric cannot fill shelves and pay debts. At some point it will become a hopeless disaster, and that reality will become the most powerful political force, towering far above partisan ideologies. Only pragmatic measures focused on fixing problems will be tolerated. Then things will get better for a while until the next disaster begins to unfold all over again.


  9. both the previous government and this one are composed of military people through and through.

    There are many military in the government: Chacon, Torres, Giofredo, Cabello.

    But from what I see they are only part of the chavernment. Maduro? Giordani? Ramirez? Jaua? Del PIno? Rodriguez? Arreaza?


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