On the heels of Jorge Giordani’s purge-hissy-fit, fellow purged leftie academic/extremist Héctor Navarro takes to the pixels of Aporrea.org to get Giordani’s back. Navarro’s shocked – shocked – that no action is being taken on Giordani’s allegations of corruption. The guy can’t believe it!
For the Endogenous-PSF faction, the fact that foreign financial institutions are giddy at Giordani’s departure is all the proof they ever needed that Maduro is selling out. It’s sort of fun to read the collective hissy-fit about it, and proof that F. Rod’s writings have caused a minor shit-storm in Pyongyang-upon-Guaire-ville. Such fun!
Once we get over the Schadenfreude, though, maybe we should think strategically about this.
Back when Maduro took over from Chávez, we could all see he was taking over a movement made up of many parts that didn’t fit comfortably with one another. Everyone could see the various bits could fly apart in Chávez’s absence. In that context, which wings of the coalition do you think Maduro was more worried about? Which bits of chavismo do you think could mount a serious challenge to his authority?
Do you think Maduro worries about alienating the professors, or the guys with the guns? The Utopian Socialists, or the guys with the testaferro empires? Whose discontent could really be a problem for him, the narcos’, or the hay-talking cafetín lefties’? The guys handling the oil money, or the altermundialista hippies?
My sense is that within the power realities of post-Chávez Venezuela, there’s no contest. Maduro doesn’t have the rhetorical gifts or the personal prestige (or, for that matter, the cash) to afford the luxury Chávez had of melding the actual power-players with the ideological-music-makers.
Guys like Giordani were, in a way, vehicles for Chávez to engage in conspicuous consumption of political capital: he had so much of it he could afford to squander some of it on luxuries like Giordani and Navarro.
With Maduro, we’re getting down to brass tacks. The guy’s one real commitment is to maintaining power, and to do so he needs to secure the loyalties of the people who handle the real levers of power in Venezuelan society: the guns, the drug routes, the oil money, and the CNE.
The rest is gravy. Y hay escasez de gravy.