Putting a lid on it

Oh what a year

When Foreign Policy asked me for a long piece on where Venezuela is headed in 2014, I had to sit back and think of the big picture. After a tumultous year that saw a presidential death, a massive funeral, two elections, the early ripples of a profound economic crisis, and even the craziness of Daka, you have to distill the issues to their essence.

Where are we going? Or more importantly, what are the factors that will determine where we are going?

I have a confession to make: after the April election, a rift appeared between Quico and I, one that has not healed. We still cannot find common ground on our appreciation of what happened in April, and on whether the opposition’s response was adequate or not.

In spite of this, we have come to a common conclusion: none of it matters, because whatever happens in Venezuela in the coming months … is not in the opposition’s hands.

Neither Capriles nor the other leaders, nor even the MUD itself can affect the outcomes, just like it couldn’t affect the outcome all year long. We can discuss strategy all we want, we can fret about them saying this or that, but ultimately, it doesn’t amount to a hill of beans. The opposition, roughly half the country at this point, is irrelevant – candidates for political roadkill. This is a petro-state autocracy, and there are only three factors that are relevant.

First, and foremost, is the price of oil. Never has a regime that on appearance seemed rock solid depended so much on the price of a single commodity. If the price of oil surges, we can simply say goodbye to any chance of regime change. If it stays the same, we will keep muddling through. If it plummets – well, all bets are off. Can it really be that simple? Part of me thinks yes.

The second aspect is the government’s popularity. During the last few months, we have been keeping track of communicational hegemony if only for the simple reason that the government’s complete monopolization of the airwaves is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for maintaining the veneer of popular legitimacy it clearly holds so dear. As long as the regime is popular, and as long as everyone knows it is popular, or as long as everyone thinks it is popular … nothing is going to happen. That is why it is so important to maintain popularity, but if that fails, to maintain an illusion of popularity.

This is not to say that a deeply unpopular government can “fake it” if it controls all the media. What it means is that it can fake it … for a few months. What it means is that it can find scapegoats to keep the illusion going while it buys time and appliances. The regime is populist in nature, and like Luis Vicente León said in the aftermath of Daka, “populism … is popular.” This means that populism breeds popularity, but it also suggests that popularity feeds a populist regime – it gives it life, and it sustains it. It may have been the phrase of the year.

The third aspect, one that I tried to delve into in my piece, is the military.

Right now, the Armed Forces are willing accomplices of everything that is happening in Venezuela. But while it’s tempting to say this is a “military” regime, the reality is that Maduro and the Cubans are outsiders with regard to the military. There is a tacit agreement between these two very distinct players, held together by the grinding machine of subsidies, distortions, and oil money that keeps the coalition together.

What happens when and if Venezuela’s economy plummets? That is anyone’s guess. My intuition is that it won’t be easy to keep revolutionary unity if, say, the price of gasoline goes up, eating away at the smuggling that part of the military thrives on. And what will happen when Cadivi is no longer the source of inmense rents for a few fat, very fat cats? And when do the “institutional” members of the Armed Forces reach a tipping point and demand an end to corruption and the infiltration of Cuban influence?

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As for this blog, 2013 was memorable in many ways. Quico and I published our first compilation, and the response was overwhelming, so a big thanks go out to all of you for supporting it. Particular gratitude goes to the many people who took time to review the book.

My thoughts go back to last February, at the height of the Chilean summer, when I hunkered down in a cabin in Patagonia and decided we simply had to get the book finished, knowing as we all did that Chávez had only a few days to live. The book’s launch date was moved up when Ernesto Villegas somberly announced, on March 4th, that Chávez’s health had taken a turn for the worst. The media surge that followed was an exciting learning experience for both of us.

We also have to thank Emiliana and Gustavo for helping us continue with this little enterprise, and for bringing their own unique perspectives to the blog. And of course, thanks go out to you, our loyal readers, who keep this place buzzing with interesting perspective.

I must say – I did not think Caracas Chronicles would outlive Hugo Chávez for long. Chávez was such a huge story, and Maduro is such an underwhelming historical figure, that I simply assumed once the fat man was dead we would all move on.

But as I see the government shut down all remaining spaces of dissent, I realize that spaces like Caracas Chronicles – small, tiny spaces of freedom – are necessary. Television channels have all gone red, as have most radio stations. Newspapers will follow next year. But the Internet will remain, so we bear a tiny bit of responsibility in keeping the flame alive. This was brought home the other day in Caracas when I met a man on the street, a stranger, who greeted me and told me he read me. That … blew me away.

Anyway, that is one mighty long way to say goodbye to 2013. In 2014, we hope to continue chronicling the revolution’s crumbling. Let’s hope this time it’s for good.

Now go back to eating your hallacas sin Chávez.