Who’s Strong Where?

/ February 6, 2012

Here’s a fun bit of statistical onanism: going through the data from the 2010 parliamentary election, who has the better allies, Henrique Capriles or Pablo Pérez?

Remarkably, the parties now supporting Pablo Pérez won more than half a million more votes in 2010 than the parties that now support Henrique Capriles. The entire gap, and then some, is accounted for by UNT’s fearsome political machine in Zulia – which contributed three-quarters of a million votes on its own:

That gives you some sense of why low turnout helps Pablo Pérez on Sunday: the fewer spontaneous voters turn up, the bigger the Machine looms in calculations. So those of you thinking those big poll leads mean 12F is a done deal really need to think again.

The key for PP is replicating his strong performance in Zulia, Táchira and – somewhat surprisingly, Miranda and Caracas too, where Copei and AD brought in a good number of votes:

Though in casual discourse, PJ’s dominance in Miranda is treated as equivalent to UNT’s in Zulia, Miranda weighs much less in HCR’s coalition than Zulia does in PP’s.

One last point worth pondering, now that we’re in Parapara mode. The rural vote seems small only because it’s broken down between so many small states.

But, added together, the 10 most rural states (Amazonas, Apure, Barinas, Cojedes, Delta, Guarico, Portuguesa, Sucre, Trujillo and Yaracuy) account for 17% of PP’s 2010 block, and 11% of HCR’s. If those 10 states were a single state, they would have been the second biggest player in PP’s 2010 coalition, and the fourth among HCR’s block in 2010.

(HT: CL.)

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21 thoughts on “Who’s Strong Where?”

  1. Interesting “statistical onanism” but I think even when you look to the polls to the people who is 100% sure that is going to vote in the primaries, HCR is still winning. I had work with PJ machinery on past elections, when I was still in Venezuela, in Miranda and is HUGE and POWERFUL. Specially after 2008 elections. On the other hand, just guessing, without looking to the proper sources, I think people in Caracas-Miranda is more willing to participate in this kind of elections that the rest of the country. Just guessing.

    At the end, I am just not sure that the “machinery” will be a game changer.

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  2. You know, before I spent a week in Maracaibo looking at PP’s machine from the inside, I didn’t think so either.

    Now, I’m thinking it’s not a done deal at all.

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  5. Fancy footwork but you really do not say more than what I was already saying early January (using the more reliable Parlatino result where people are free of the influence of local alliances for representative and thus can vote their heart’s content).

    If I modify my numbers for the “Capoldo effect” I would change that January post for Capriles 1.5 million votes and Perez 1 million. If you factor in the borderline lousy campaign of Perez and the unexpalainable stagnation of Maria Corina, well, you get the numbers of Datanalisis today which do not include the State of Parapara. That is, if I add 2/3 of my “uncommitted” then, I get Capriles at 2 and Perez around 1, assuming that Parapara comes through for him. Or in other words, around 60% for Capriles depending how well MCM manages her last days of campaign.

    http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2012/01/predicting-unpredictable-primaries.html

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    • PS: this a theoretical prediction, of course. I am just expanding from my post one month ago which aims was to define the primary result “on paper”. I have not accounted for all yet, including machinery, local races effect, and will make my final one next Saturday when I also will publish my endorsement. I certainly will give Capoldo 50% but I am not sure yet how much higher I should go.

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    • “unexpalainable stagnation of Maria Corina”

      What are you talking about? It’s perfectly explainable, Venezuela is the land of Caudillos, not the land of Doña Bárbara or Manuela Sáenz. It doesn´t help that she tells people cold reality instead of the Chavismo Light approach of PP and HCR. Just go through your own personal post on the consequences of 4F, we’re still stuck in the 19th and early 20th century as a society. I personally thought she had a snowball’s chance in hell of getting any signifcant traction.

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      • But it’s not because she is a woman. It’s because her message is not right. because she doesn’t have enough experience, or alliances, or structure. There are a million reasons why she stagnated, different than the fact that she is a woman.

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        • No, it does not have anything to do with the fact that she’s a woman (have you not noticed how many women get elected, without fuss- to executive positions?), it’s just because the race became -somewhat- polarised. That’s why LL dropped out. MCM is playing a different game, and is well beyond the reach of runner-up.

          Alas, Diego Arria and Pablo Medina, who come from zero, have a lot to gain by staying in the race. And yet they obviously have not made any real progress, despite being men.

          So quite the caudillismo thing…

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  6. The AD-UNT alliance looked powerful on paper, but the problem, IMO, is the candidate’s dullness and lack of a defined identity. You may have the machine and the best advisors, but if your raw material is failed, there isn’t much you can do about it.

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    • Exactly. As I wrote earlier in recent weeks, Pablo Perez’s campaign has been uninspired in all aspects. Just a detail to make the case: In the other candidates’ websites there’s information about where and when the candidates will be campaigning. The only exception: Pablo Perez. His site tells you where and when he has been, but not where and when he will be in the future. People in Parquisimeto only knew that Pablo was coming when he was already here. #FAIL.

      If the primary is decided by the battle of “maquinarias”, then it could be close. Why?
      Let’s take a look. UNT have its turf of Zulia rounded up and thet have worked in recent years to build their own structures in the rest of the country. Here’s where AD & COPEI machineries can help in the smaller states (AD in Oriente and Central Llanos, COPEI in Western Llanos like Barinas and the Andes.) But PJ has deveolped its own strongholds in Caracas & Miranda, along with Aragua. Then HCR has made alliances with PPT (Lara, Portuguesa, Guarico & Amazonas), PODEMOS (Aragua, Anzoategui, Sucre), Causa R (Bolivar) and recently, with the “capoldo” affair, the machinery of Proyecto Venezuela in Carabobo and the new but efficient crew of Voluntad Popular.

      Pablo depends more of its machinery but the one he has have more experience compared to the one HCR has. That’s where the well-done campaign of HCR has created the counterbalance that can give him the edge. Of course thsi depends that the votes that originally went to Leopoldo (like a relative of mine), finally go to HCR. Also, the late surge of MCM (real or mediatic, we’ll know on Sunday) could influence the final outcome.

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    • Although I intend to vote for Capriles, it’s very annoying (to say the least) that a political party (because it’s a party) calls itself “the Venezuelan Ecological Movement”. The real ecological movement is far more diverse, and I doubt that they are supporting any of the candidates as a uniform group.

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      • I was joking, Cal. I have expressed here a couple of times my contempt for that party in Venezuela…and I feel sympathy for the Green parties in such countries as Germany.
        These guys may give Capriles two votes, perhaps three if they manage to convince their sister.

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